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I.

INTRODUCTION

Everyone, it seems, is opposed to terrorism. Yet from the perspective of international law, not every insurgency is terroristic. Indeed,
in a world that continues to deprive millions of individuals of the
minimum standards of human dignity, certain insurgencies are fundamentally law-enforcing (a condition that should be especially familiar
to all those who celebrate the American Revolution of 1776). With
such facts as a starting point, this paper will identify the differences
between lawful and unlawful insurgency under international law.
II.

STANDARDS AND EXPECTATIONS

International law has consistently proscribed particular acts of international terrorism.I At the same time, however, it codifies the right

*Louis Ren6 Beres, Professor of Political Science and International Law at Purdue University, lectures and publishes widely on matters relating to terrorism, nuclear war, nuclear strategy
and human rights. Born in Zurich, Switzerland on August 31, 1945, he was educated at Princeton
(Ph.D., 1971) and is the author of many books, monographs and articles in the field. He also
contributes regular guest editorials to such newspapers as the New York Times, The Los
Angeles Times, The Washington Post, The Christian Science Monitor, Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Evening Sun, St. Louis Post Dispatch, USA Today, Louisville Courier Journal, Dallas
Morning News, etc. His newest book on terrorism is a second edition of TERRORISM AND
GLOBAL SECURITY: THE NUCLEAR THREAT (Westview, 1987).
1. On December 9, 1985, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a
resolution condemning all acts of terrorism as "criminal." (See United Nations Resolution on
Terrorism, G.A. Res. 40/61, 40 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 301, U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (1985)).
Never before had the Assembly adopted such a comprehensive resolution on this question. Yet
the issue of particular acts that actually constitute terrorism is left largely unresolved, except
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of insurgents to use certain levels and types of force when fundamental
human rights are repressed and where non-violent methods of redress
are unavailable. Inhabiting a sovereignty-centered system wherein the
normative rules of the human rights regime are normally not enforceable by central global institutions, the individual victims of human
rights abuse must seek relief by humanitarian assistance or by rebelling. Indeed, without such self-help remedies, the extant protection
of human rights in a decentralized legal setting would be entirely a
fiction, assuring little more than the primacy of Realpolitik.
The current human rights regime originated in ancient Greece and
Rome. 2 From Greek Stoicism and Roman law to the present, the jus
gentium (law of nations) and modern international law have accepted
individuals' rights to overthrow tyrants and to forcefully oppose tyrannical regimes when necessary. This acceptance can be found primarily
in international custom, the general principles of law recognized by
nations, United Nations General Assembly resolutions, various judicial
decisions, specific compacts and documents, 3 the writings of highly
for acts such as hijacking, hostage taking, and attacks on internationally protected persons that
were criminalized by previous custom and conventions. And even in these cases the practical
problem of gaining support for the "extradite or prosecute" formula remains a serious impediment
to effective counter-terrorism. On conventional law in force regarding terrorism, see, e.g., The
Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (Tokyo Convention), Sept. 14, 1963, F04 U.N.T.S. 219, 20 U.S.T. 2941 (entered into force Dec. 4, 1969);
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), Dec. 16,
1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641 (entered into force Oct. 14, 1971); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24
U.S.T. 564 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1973). See also International Convention Against the
Taking of Hostages, Dec. 17, 1979, G.A. Res. 34/14b (XXXIV), 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. 00,
reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979). Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961,
23 U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. 7502, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (entered into force for the United States Dec.
13, 1972); Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected
Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532 (entered into force
for the United States Feb. 20, 1977); Final Act on the Conference on Security and Cooperation
in Europe Done at Helsinki, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292 (1975) (also known as
the Helsinki Accords).
2. See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A
(III), 3 U.N. GAOR I at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, G.A. Res. 2106A, 20
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.14) 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in 5
I.L.M. 352 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360
(1967); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966,
G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doec. A/6316 (1966), reprinted in
6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
3. See, e.g., the Magna Carta (1215); the Petition of Right (1628); the English Bill of Rights
(1689); the United States' Declaration of Independence (1776); the Declaration of the Rights of
Man and of the Citizen (1789).
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qualified publicists (e.g., Cicero; Francisco de Vitoria; Hugo Grotius
and Emmerich de Vattel) and, by extrapolation, from the convergence
of human rights law with the absence of effective, authoritative central
institutions in world politics.
The first jurisprudential standard for differentiating between lawful
insurgency and terrorism is "just cause." Where individual states prevent the exercise of human rights, insurgency may express law-enforcing reactions under international law. However,,. the means used in
that insurgency must be consistent with the second jurisprudential
standard, "just means."
Discrimination, proportionality and military necessity are some of
the factors states should use when deciding whether a particular insurgency is an instance of terrorism or law enforcement. Terrorism
takes place when insurgents apply force broadly to any segment of
human population. Similarly, terrorism begins when insurgents apply
force to the fullest possible extent, restrained only by the limits of
available weaponry.
The legitimacy of a certain cause does not legitimize the use of
certain forms of violence. As in the case of war between states, every
use of force by insurgents must be judged twice, once with regard to
the justness of the objective, and once with regard to the justness of
the means used in pursuit of that objective.
The explicit application of codified restrictions of the laws of war
to non-international armed conflicts dates back only as far as the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949. However, recalling that the laws of war,
like the whole of international law, are comprised of more than treaties
and conventions, it is clear that the obligations of jus in bello (justice
in war) are part of the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations and are binding upon all categories of belligerents. Indeed,
the Hague Convention (No. IV) of 1907 declared in broad terms that
in the absence of a precisely published set of guidelines in humanitarian
international law concerning "unforeseen cases," all belligerency is
governed by all of the pre-conventional sources of international law:
Until a more complete code of the laws of war has been
issued, the High Contracting Parties deem it expedient to
declare that, in cases not included in the Regulations adopted
by them, the inhabitants and the belligerents remain under
the protection and the rule of the principles of the law of
nations, as they result from the usages established among
civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates
of public conscience.4
4. Convention (No. IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, With Annex
of Regulations, Oct. 18, 1907. 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539, 1 Bevans 631 (entered into force for
the United States, Jan. 26, 1910; commonly known as "the Hague Regulations").
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This "more complete code" became available with the adoption of
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions. These agreements contained a
common article (3) under which the convention provisions would be
applicable in non-international armed conflicts. Nevertheless, the 1949
Geneva Diplomatic Conference rejected the idea that all of the laws
of war should apply to internal conflicts, and in 1970 the United Nations
Secretary General requested that additional rules relating to non international armed conflicts be adopted in the form of a protocol or a
separate convention.
In 1974 the Swiss government convened in Geneva the Diplomatic
Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts. On 8 June 1977 the
Conference formally adopted two protocols additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949. Protocol II relates "to the Protection
of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts" and develops and
supplements common article 3 of the 1949 Conventions. In the fashion
of common article 3 and article 19 of the 1954 Hague Cultural Property
Convention, Protocol II does not apply to situations of internal disturbances and tensions such as riots or isolated and sporadic acts of
violence. It does, however, apply to all armed conflicts
which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party
between its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other
organized armed groups which, under responsible command,
exercise such control over a part of its territory as to enable
them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this Protocol. 5
Geneva Protocol 1 also constrains insurgent uses of force in "armed
conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination and
alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their
right of self-determination." Thus, even where the peremptory rights
to self-determination are being exercised, insurgent forces must resort
to lawful means of combat. According to article 35, which reaffirms
longstanding norms of international law: "[i]n any armed conflict, the
rights of the parties to the conflict to choose methods or means of
'6
warfare is not unlimited.
5. Geneva Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions Aug. 12, 1949 and relating to
the protection of victims of non international armed conflicts, art. I, opened for signature Dec.
12, 1977 entered into force Dec. 7, 1978.
6. Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, art. 35, (opened for signature
Dec. 12, 1977 (entered into force December 7, 1978)). See Id. at art. 92 for status twelve months
thereafter.
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States also have an obligation to treat captured insurgents in conformity with the basic dictates of international law. Although this
obligation does not normally interfere with a state's right to regard
as common or ordinary criminals those persons not engaged in armed
conflict (that is, persons involved merely in internal disturbances,
riots, isolated and specific acts of violence, or other acts of a similar
nature), it does mean that all other captives remain under the protection and authority of international law.
In cases where captive persons are engaged in armed conflict, it
may mean an additional obligation of states to extend the privileged
status of prisoner of war (POW) to such persons. This additional obligation is unaffected by insurgent respect for the laws of war of
international law. While all combatants are obliged to comply with
the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, violations
of these rules do not automatically deprive an insurgent combatant of
his right to protection equivalent in all respects to that accorded to
prisoners of war. This right, codified by the Geneva Conventions, is
now complemented and enlarged by the two protocols to those conventions.
III. JUSTICE AND GEOPOLITICS
Since the end of the Second World War, there has been a revolution
in international legal affairs. Among other things, this revolution has
essentially removed a state's treatment of its own nationals from the
realm of "domestic jurisdiction" whenever such treatment fails to conform to particular normative standards. Expanding upon the longstanding principle of humanitarian intervention, the Nuremberg judgment and Nuremberg principles placed additional and far-reaching
limits on the authority of particular states. Reasoning that the individual human being, as the ultimate unit of all law, is entitled to the
protection of humankind when the state tramples upon its rights "in
a manner that outrages the conscience of mankind," the Tribunal firmly
established the obligation of states to intervene in other states
whenever such outrages are committed.
In the absence of viable community enforcement capabilities in our
decentralized international society, the opportunities for justice require voluntary patterns of compliance and support by individual governments. The prevailing expectation is that such patterns will be
especially and consistently acknowledged by the world's major powers.
It follows that punishment of gross violations of human rights is now
well within the jurisdictional scope of the general community of humankind.
If states continue to turn their back on responsible enforcement
of the international law of human rights, they will forfeit their last
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
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practical chance for coping with terrorism. The problem, as we have
seen, lies in recognizing the principle of "just cause" for insurgency
(a principle enshrined in our western traditions and in the law of
nations) and in distinguishing between lawful and unlawful insurgencies under international law.
The global imperative, therefore, must be to condemn not only
insurgent terror, but also "regime" terror. Regime terror, which contradicts the extant rules and principles of international law, breeds
insurgent terror. If states are to be true to their international legal
obligations and long-term geopolitical interests, they cannot continue
to selectively support the former while selectively combatting the
latter.
Consider United States support for South Africa. The South African constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights to protect the natural
rights of the individual. Even under the best of circumstances, i.e.,
one without the special harshness of emergency powers, police officers
can arrest any person suspected of being a terrorist without warrant.
The suspect may be held for interrogation for as long as it takes "to
reply satisfactorily to all questions of the said interrogation." In other
words, a suspect may be held until a carefully-orchestrated pattern
of beatings and torture elicit the desired response.
Detainees can be held for more than a year without being formally
charged. While under detention, a detainee may not receive any visits
from family, friends, clergy or counsel. There is, of course, no right
of habeas corpus or recourse to the courts. If the courts find the
suspect guilty, he can be sentenced to death.
What is the shape of "freedom" within United States client regimes
in Central America? In El Salvador death squads and government
troops kill, rape and mutilate thousands of noncombatant civilians.
The types of torture reported to Amnesty International include beatings, sexual abuse, use of chemicals, mock executions and the burning of
flesh with sulphuric acid. According to Amnesty International, "[t]he
units responsible for these abuses have included El Salvador's regular
armed forces, naval as well as land forces, and special security forces
such as the National Guard, the National Police and the Treasury

Police. "7
In Guatemala, one regime picks up where the other has left off.
Whoever happens to be in power at the moment resolves dissent by
administering torture. During the Lucas Garcia period (1978-1982),
those who had "disappeared" were discovered, says Amnesty Interna-

7.

See Torture in the Eighties, Amnesty Int'l Report 156 (1984).
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tional, with "cigarette burns, castration, traces of insecticide in the
hair indicating the use of a 'capucha,' a hood impregnated with noxious
chemicals, allegedly used to the point of suffocation, multiple slashing
often inflicted with machetes, sometimes severing entire limbs. "8 After
a new government took power, nothing changed. In July 1982, Amnesty International issued a special briefing paper (Massive Extrajudicial Executions in Rural Areas Under the Government of General
Afrain Rios Montt) which concluded that Guatemalan government
troops continued 'the widespread use of torture and the killing of
large numbers of rural noncombatant civilians including young children
)9

Honduras, centerpiece of American military operations in Central
America, has been instrumental in supporting indiscriminate attacks,
including the use of torture and mutilation upon fleeing Salvadoran
refugees, consisting of mostly women and children. According to Amnesty International, "[o]n a number of occasions torture has led to
deaths of prisoners in custody, as well as of non-combatant civilians
killed by soldiers carrying out counter-insurgency operations in areas
near the Salvadoran border."1°
Who, exactly, are the terrorists? Are they the black South African
guerrillas who oppose a white minority-ruled apartheid regime?" Are
they the individuals amongst the neighboring frontline states who
support black South African insurgents? Are they the Namibians who
support the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in a
United Nations-sanctioned opposition to South African control? Are
they the Salvadoran rebels? Are they also the rightist "death squads"
that operate throughout Latin America? What about the Afghan Moslem guerrillas combatting Soviet troops or Iran's ethnic Kurds? What
about Unita? What about the contras?
And what about states that support or even sustain insurgent
organizations? The problem, of course, is exceedingly complex, depending, in part, on the cause and in part on the means. Although state
sponsorship of insurgencies in other states may be lawful as an indispensable corrective to gross violations of human rights, such sponsor-

8. Id. at 158.
9. Id. at 160.
10. Id. at 165.

11. On the particular crime of apartheid, see International Convention on the Suppression
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No 30),
U.N. Doc A/9030 (1974) (entered into force July 18, 1976). See also International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. Res. 2160A, 20 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966) (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969).
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ship is patently unlawful whenever its rationale lies in presumptions
of geopolitical advantage. Today the long-standing customary prohibition against foreign support for lawless insurgencies is codified in the
United Nations Charter and in the authoritative interpretation of that
multilateral treaty at article 1 and article 3(g) of the General Assembly's 1974 Definition of Aggression.
The legal systems embodied in the constitutions of individual states
are an interest that all states must normally defend against aggression.
Hersch Lauterpacht expressed this peremptory principle. According
to Lauterpacht, the following rule concerns the scope of state responsibility for preventing acts of insurgency or terrorism against other
states:
International law imposes upon the State the duty of restraining persons within its territory from engaging in such
revolutionary activities against friendly States as amount to
organized acts of force in the form of hostile expeditions
against the territory of those States. It also obliges the
States to repress and discourage activities in which attempts
against the life of political opponents
are regarded as a proper
12
means of revolutionary action.
Lauterpacht's rule reaffirms the Resolution on the Rights and
Duties of Foreign Powers as Regards the Established and Recognized
Governments in Case of Insurrection adopted by the Institute of International Law in 1900. His rule, however, stops short of the prescription offered by Emmerich de Vattel. According to Vattel's The Law
of Nations, states that support terrorism directed at other states
become the lawful prey of the world community:
If there should be found a restless and unprincipled nation,
ever ready to do harm to others, to thwart their purposes,
and to stir up civil strife among their citizens, there is no
doubt that all others would have the right to unite together
to subdue such a nation, to discipline it, and even to disable
it from doing further harm.s
IV.

TAKING STANDARDS SERIOUSLY

The greatest danger of terrorism lies in misconceived intuitions of
Realpolitik. To meet the requirements of effective counterterrorism,

12.

See H.

13.

EMMERICH

LAUTERPACHT,

The Law of Peace, in 3

INTERNATIONAL LAW 274 (1977).

DE VATrEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL

LAW 130 (C. W. Fenwick trans., 1916).
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decent states must oppose repressive regimes and movements whatever their ideological stripe. They must also support those insurgencies
that spring from genuinely "just cause" and that are carried out with
due regard for the laws of war of international law. 14
It follows from all this that it is pointless to speak of the control
of terrorism per se. Rather, the control of terrorism must always be
contingent upon context - on the nature of the regime within which
insurgency is taking place, and - where appropriate - the reasonableness of transnational force. To respond to insurgencies directed
against repressive regimes with assistance for those regimes would
be wrong from the perspective of international law. Indeed, states in
world politics, when recognizing the principle of "just cause," should
always consider the reasonableness of supporting the insurgents in
such cases - especially where the insurgencies are conducted according to the laws of war of international law. Ideally, the judgments of
other states here should be determined exclusively by the standards
of jus ad bellum and jus in bello, and should ignore the presumed
expectations of Realpolitik.
In those cases where insurgencies are directed against democratic
regimes (circumstances wherein the criterion of "just cause" is unlikely
to be met), the control of terrorism becomes an entirely different
matter. In these cases, the protection of human rights compels vigorous anti-insurgent methods rather than possible support of insurgents.
The reasonableness of such methods is enhanced where the insurgents
conduct their operations with flagrant disregard for discrimination and
proportionality.
States may need to enact appropriate forms of domestic law to
implement these methods. In the United States, as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Congress approved an Act for
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking. Following the provisions of the Hostages Convention (1979), the Act
punishes the seizure or detaining of a person, coupled with threats to

14. Significantly, official United States government definitions of terrorism do not allow
for "just cause," a situation that is contrary not only to prevailing international law but also to
the current administration's own geopolitical arguments. These definitions, therefore, are not
only lawless but profoundly unintelligible. According to the September 1984 definition offered
by the Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, which has been reaffirmed regularly:
"Terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence for political purpose to create a state of
fear that will aid in extorting, coercing, intimidating or otherwise causing individuals and groups
to alter their behavior." (See International Terrorism, GIST). By this definition, of course, the
18th century revolutionary insurgency that led to creation of the United States was terrorism.
Similarly, the United States-supported contras are also terrorists under this definition.
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kill, injure or continue to detain the person, for the purpose of compelling a third person or a governmental organization to do or abstain
from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for the release
of the detained person.
To fully implement its responsibilities under the Convention for
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation
(the Montreal Convention, 1972) the United States enacted the Aircraft
Sabotage Act as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984. Moreover, to authorize the United States (specifically the Attorney General and the Secretary of State) to pay rewards of up to
$500,000 for information concerning terrorist activity, Congress
enacted the Act to Combat International Terrorism of 1984. Taken
together, these recent United States legislative measures contribute
to this country's ability to cooperate internationally against terrorism.
There are other contexts, however, that are more complex. For
example, the threat of terrorism that now confronts the United States
and its interests abroad flows largely from the Reagan administration's
effective indifference to human rights in anti-Soviet states (e.g., Chile,
Paraguay, South Korea, South Africa). Recognizing the alliance between their oppressive rulers and United States policy, the oppressed
in these states may increasingly target Americans as well as oligarchs.
In this connection much depends on the willingness of the Bush Administration to change direction.
Careful analysis suggests that the most promising new initiative in
controlling terrorism is an early sensitivity to the terrorism-generating
qualities of certain foreign policies. This raises the issue of individual
states that oppose terrorism selectively, or - stated differently oppose certain terrorist groups while supporting others. In this connection, the Reagan administration's position on the contras was revealing. In distinguishing between "terrorists" and "freedom fighters"
(what we might call here unlawful and lawful insurgents), the former
President embraced no jurisprudentialstandard of judgment. Rather,
his only criterion was anti-Sovietism. It follows from this criterion
that efforts to overthrow allegedly pro-Soviet regimes (even ones with
which the United States has diplomatic relations) were always conducted by "freedom fighters," while efforts to oppose anti-Soviet regimes (e.g., South Africa) were always conducted by "terrorists."
From the standpoint of international law, this manner of distinction
has absolutely no validity. Before we can proceed with appropriate
initiatives in the control of terrorism, we must recognize settled jurisprudential standards that distinguish lawful from unlawful insurgencies. We cannot accept any other criteria that would deform the natural
rights of humankind.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol3/iss3/1
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The alternative, for international law, is to remain little more than
an instrument of national policy, rationalizing decisions that are
grounded exclusively in geopolitical calculations. Worse, the day may
not be far off when governments no longer even feel the need to seek
legal camouflage to justify their most illegal policies. In almost all of
the recent, major United States foreign policy controversies - e.g.,
arms for Iran; the contras and Nicaragua; complicity in apartheid with
South Africa - international law was almost never raised as a serious
factor. Even when the former President of the United States declared
his "Cry Uncle" standard for determining force levels against
Nicaragua, there was little or no reaction to his flagrant disregard
for the United Nations Charter and international law.
V. TERRORISM AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
Let us look more closely at Nicaragua. There are two overarching
problems with United States actions against Nicaragua under international law: their intrinsically illegal character and persistent American
unwillingness to submit to the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice (ICJ). According to the major law making treaty, article 94
paragraph 1 of the United Nations Charter: "(1) [e]ach member of the
United Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the International Court of Justice in any case to which it is a party."15 Although
the United States argued that the ICJ did not have jurisdiction to
decide upon the Nicaraguan complaint on its own merits, the Court
-

on November 26, 1984 -

rejected this argument. In response, the

United States, in clear violation of the obligations created at article
36 paragraph 6 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice,
withdrew from any further participation in the Merits phase of litigation. This withdrawal took place on January 18, 1985.
There is not any legally defensible argument on behalf of a foreign
policy that relies preeminently upon military force and the threat of
armed coercion. According to article 2(3) of the United Nations Charter: "[a]ll members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful
means in such a manner that international peace and security, and
justice, are not endandered.'

6

This binding norm notwithstanding,

United States policy toward Nicaragua has been founded upon the
use of military pressure to produce a settlement presumed favorable
to the United States.

15. U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1.
16. Id. at art. 2, para. 3.
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The clear impermissibility of United States actions against
Nicaragua can be extrapolated from article 2 paragraph 4 of the Charter: "[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with
the Purposes of the United Nations. 1' 7 These actions, which were
never authorized by the United Nations Security Council or by an
authoritative regional organization, also violated other binding treaty
obligations. According to article 20 of the Organization of American
States (OAS) Charter: "It]he territory of a state is inviolable; it may
not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other
measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly.'
And article I of the Rio Treaty established, "It]he High Contracting
Parties formally condemn war and undertake in their international
relations not to resort to the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations
or of this Treaty."' 9
Another hemispheric treaty that points unambiguously to United
States aggression against Nicaragua is the 1928 Convention on the
Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. Article I of
this treaty, to which both the United States and Nicaragua are parties,
establishes:
[T]he contracting States bind themselves to observe the following rules with regard to civil strife in another one of them:
First: To use all means at their disposal to prevent the
inhabitants of their territory, nationals or aliens, from participating in, gathering elements, crossing the boundary or
sailing from their territory
for the purpose of starting or
20
promoting civil strife.
In addition, the United Nations General Assembly's 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations, adopted by consensus and with United

17. Id.
18. See CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, Apr. 30, 1948. 2 U.S.T.
2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951).
19. See INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE, Sept. 2, 1947. 62 Stat.
1681., T.I.A.S. No. 1838, 121 U.N.T.S. 77 (commonly known as "the Rio Pact," it entered into
force Dec. 3, 1948).
20. These obligations are reaffirmed by the U.N. Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention, G.A. Res. 2131, GAOR Supp. (No. 14), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965); and by the U.N. Resolution
on the Definition of Aggression, G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N.
Doc. A/9631 (1975).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol3/iss3/1

12

TERRORISM AND INTERNATIONAL

LAW

Beres: Terrorism and International Law

States approval, offered the following authoritative elucidation of article 2(4): "[e]very State has the duty to refrain from organizing or
encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands, in21
cluding mercenaries, for incursion into the territory of another State.
The Reagan administration rejected Nicaraguan claims before the
ICJ, in part, on the ground that the Court had become politicized and
that issues before it were no longer dealt with on their merits. In
this connection, President Reagan intimated that the ICJ is not a
court "in the true sense of the word," that is it does not consist of
disinterested parties, and that it is primarily antidemocratic, antiWestern and anti-United States. This argument, which apparently did
not obtain when the United States brought a complaint against Iran
on November 29, 1979 (see below), is contingent upon a highly particularistic definition of "political," and stands in ironic contrast to
American responses to the Nicaraguan claim.
From the beginning, the Reagan administration attempted to defend its manifold assaults upon the sovereignty of Nicaragua by discrediting the Sandinista regime. The clear purpose of this strategy
was to create the impression that this regime was intrinsically criminal (because it was allegedly Marxist and pro Soviet) and therefore
beyond the usual pale of jurisprudential protection. If, after all, a
state is simply a shadow of an Evil Empire, what possible justification
can there be for granting it the usual rights and privileges of statehood?
In support of its position before the ICJ, however, the Reagan
administration relied upon the following political arguments. First, it
argued that Nicaragua's request that the Court indicate provisional
measures (to preserve its rights during the course of judicial proceedings) "could irreparably prejudice the interests of a number of states
and seriously interfere with negotiations being conducted pursuant to
the Contadora process." Second, it argued that other Central American
states, especially El Salvador, Honduras and Costa Rica, had rights
and interests that made them "indispensible parties in whose absence
this Court cannot properly proceed." And third, it argued that the
ICJ should decline Nicaragua's request for provisional measures because such questions regarding the use of force during hostilities are
more properly committed to resolution by the political organs of the
United Nations and of the Organization of American States.

21. See Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
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None of these arguments has any basis in international law. The
ICJ had appropriate jurisdiction over the case brought by Nicaragua,
both under the compulsory jurisdiction established in article 36 of its
Statute and pursuant to the 1956 United States-Nicaragua Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation.2 Moreover, the United States
references to the Contadora process and political settlement were
ironic in view of (1) persistent United States obstruction of that process
and (2) the fact that the "hostilities" described had been initiated and
sustained by the United States. It follows that the only rationale for
these arguments was to bring a contentious matter away from an
authoritative legal process, where United States defeat was certain,
and into a context dominated by considerations of Realpolitik, where
victory might be assured via military coercion.
On November 29, 1979, the United States submitted its case
against Iran before the ICJ. In particular, the United States charged
that Iran had violated the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations, the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the
1973 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against
Diplomats, the 1955 United States-Iran Treaty of Amity and the Charter of the United Nations. The jurisdiction of the Court, said the
United States, was established at paragraph 1 of article 36 of the
Statute of the ICJ. The United States and Iran, as members of the
United Nations, were parties to the Statute and were also parties to
three international conventions that independently established the
Court's jurisdiction over the Teheran embassy affair. 3
On April 9, 1984, Nicaragua initiated proceedings against the
United States in the ICJ.2- In particular, Nicaragua charged that both
it and the United States had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of
the Court under the terms of article 36 (a position upheld by the
Court) and that the Court held an independent basis of jurisdiction
under the terms of the 1956 United States-Nicaragua Treaty of
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation. In establishing the merit basis
for its claim, Nicaragua also cited the United Nations Charter, the
22. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation and Protocol, Jan. 21, 1956, United
States - Nicaragua, 9 U.S.T. 449, T.I.A.S. No. 4024, 367 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force May
24, 1958; notice of termination given by United States, May 1, 1985, effective May 1, 1986).
23. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, supra note 1; Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (entered
into force for the United States Dec. 24, 1969); Convention on the Prevention and punishment
of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents, supra note 1.
24. See Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (commonly known as the Military Activities Case or the Nicaraguan
Mining Case).
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Organization of American States (OAS) Charter, the 1933 Montivideo
Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, the 1928 Havana
Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil
Strife and customary international law.
Comparing these two cases, a clear pattern emerges. The claims
brought before the Court by Nicaragua were founded upon the same
essential sources of international law brought in the earlier case against
Iran by the United States. Thus, the Reagan administration charges
that the Nicaraguan claims were not well established in law were
prima facie unreasonable.
To act in its own interests in Central America, the United States
must restore respect for its own traditions and for the rules of international law. With such respect, the intuitions of Realpolitik could be
replaced by the essential requirements of co-existence. Newly informed of the differences between violence and power, this nation
could recognize that impermissible intervention in the region is inherently self-defeating.
Increasingly, international law is not often taken very seriously.
One reason for this is that scholars have failed to communicate - to
the public and to governments around the world - that compliance
with international law is compatible with national interest. Another
reason is that scholars have failed to speak publicly in support of
independent normative standards, and in opposition to national policies
that are in clear violation of international law. For whatever reasons,
academicians have accepted for their discourse a concept of terrorism
that often has nothing to do with international law. This concept is
determined by their respective governments, by prevailing configurations of national and international power and by the Cold War.
More than we care to admit, we are prisoners of Realpolitik, offering lip service to peremptory norms while offering real allegiance only
to power and ideology. If we sincerely seek to control terrorism, we
must first remind ourselves that lawful definitions are created not by
individual governments for adversary political purposes, but by the
sources enumerated at article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ. We must
also remind ourselves that international law has no place for selective
concern about human rights - concern dictated, inter alia, by ritual
deference to a contrived East-West struggle.
Today, of course, all states are expected to comply with a far-reaching and largely codified human rights regime. At the same time, of
course, there is a significant gap between the normative expectations
of this regime and actual state practice. In certain instances, the threat
of terrorism is exaggerated by governments to justify repression.
Ironically, as repression hardens, the pretext sometimes becomes
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
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genuine; the prophecy is self-fulfilled. In these instances, where insurgents have manifestly "just cause," international legal initiatives
should be directed against regime terror-especially where the insurgents comply with the international laws of war.
VI.

CONCLUSION

We know now that not every insurgency is an instance of terrorism.
We also know that the fear of terrorism can occasion human rights
abuse by particular governments - that such abuses can be undertaken in the name of counter-terrorism. But what can be done by international law to limit control of insurgency to genuine instances of
terrorism and to prevent state manipulation of counter-terrorism for
purposes of repression or propaganda? The answer to this question is
largely political. It is not jurisprudential. The answer lies preeminently in reducing the primacy of geopolitics in world affairs. Unless
states begin to reject the prevailing axes of conflict in global power
relations they will never be able to control most forms of terrorism.
The world should no longer be willing to accept the caricature of
Free World/Socialist World dichotomies. Although the Soviet Union
has certainly been a repressive society, the United States is hardly
blameless. If there is an essential difference between the Brezhnev
Doctrine and the Reagan Doctrine from the perspective of international
law (both doctrines invoke the "right" to violate the peremptory obligations of non intervention and to exempt their respective states from
the normative expectations of the United Nations Charter) it has yet
to be revealed.
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